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Religiosity and the Invocation of Law in the
Conversation with the Dalai Lama
DAVID

M. ENGELt

The Dalai Lama's visit to UB Law School carried
genuine symbolic importance. In this colorful and crowded
event, one of the foremost religious leaders of our era sat in
a law library with a group of legal specialists to talk about
constitutionalism and the rule of law. A person some view
as sacred calmly and thoughtfully discussed the central
features of a legal framework that could limit his own
authority within the Tibetan polity.
Those of us who participated in the conversation with
the Dalai Lama felt acutely aware that his efforts run
counter to much of today's discourse about law and religion.
Religious devotees, policymakers, and members of the
general public typically perceive secular legality in tension
with or even in opposition to religion. For example, Carol
Greenhouse, in her classic study of a predominantly
Southern Baptist community in Georgia, described a shared
understanding that overt conflict and the invocation of law
were to be avoided because they threatened the integrity of
the society as a whole. Prayer offered a preferred approach
to the problem of dispute resolution. Members of this
community viewed religion and law as mutually exclusive,
and they assumed that the truly religious person would
reject law even when he or she suffered a wrong.'
I have encountered a similar perspective in my own
community-based research on injuries and the use of tort
law, both in the United States and in Thailand. In a rural
Midwestern American community, ministers, priests, and
members of their congregations expressed the view that
religious people do not sue when injured, because the
t SUNY Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School
of Law.
1. See CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, ORDER, AND
COMMUNITY IN AN AMERICAN TOWN (1989).
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invocation of law is inconsistent with religious teachings.
Some personal injury lawyers also believe this to be true.
An American Trial Lawyers Association (ATLA) manual
cautions that prospective jurors should be screened for their
religious views during voir dire, since a devout juror is
likely to believe that the plaintiffs misfortune represents
the will of God. Such jurors, it is said, tend to condemn
personal injury litigation because
they think it violates
3
fundamental religious precepts.

In predominantly Buddhist Thailand, interviewees
perceived a similar tension between secular law and their
religious belief. Ordinary people who suffered injuries
thought that the pursuit of a legal remedy would merely
compound the bad karma that produced the injury in the
first place. A devout Buddhist, in their view, should focus
her attention on meritorious action in response to an injury
and should forgive the injurer rather than aggressively
pursue compensation. 4 The Thai interviewees' actions were
consistent with their words. None of them invoked the law
after suffering serious injury caused by the careless
behavior of another, and few of them in their injury
narratives even hinted that their mishap might be
characterized as a legal violation.
The injured people I interviewed in Buddhist Thailand
referred to their belief in karma to explain why they seldom
took any action-judicial or extra-judicial-against their
injurers, even in cases where they clearly felt that the
injurer had wronged them and they had suffered a serious
loss as a result. In their view, the root cause of the injury
was their own improper behavior earlier in this life or in a
prior life. Accordingly, the proper solution to an injury was
to perform meritorious acts, to manifest a generous and

2. See DAVID M. ENGEL, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and
Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 551, 571
(1984) ("[One minister] argued that external problems such as personal injuries
were secondary to primary questions of religious faith. He told me, '[I]f we first
of all get first things straightened out and that is our relationship with God and
is our help from God, all of these other things will fall into order."').
3. See David A. Wenner, Jury Bias, in ATLA'S LITIGATING TORT CASES
§ 35.23 (2003).
4. See DAVID M. ENGEL, Globalization and the Decline of Legal
Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts, and Karma in Thailand, 30 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY
469 (2005).
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compassionate spirit, to reject an attachment to material
rewards, and to forgive the injurer. Pursuit of compensation
would merely result in continued suffering in this life or in
future lives.
Although my research has focused on injuries, the same
karmic explanations and emphasis on selflessness and
forgiveness rather than an embrace of the law appear
applicable in many other conflict situations. Interviewees
described a broad range of rights violations for which they
believed the appropriate response to be law avoidance. It is
safe to say that ordinary people in Thailand very often view
Buddhism and law in oppositional terms. The invocation of
rights is problematic for them and represents a moral
failure, just as it did for Greenhouse's Southern Baptists.
People who assert rights are selfish and egotistical, and
their aggressive response will surely cause more trouble
down the road. The law of karma is, in their view, at odds
with-and superior to-the law of the state.
When the Dalai Lama addressed this issue in our
conversation, he seemed to express only a qualified support
for the individual who responds to wrongdoing with selfrestraint rather than by invoking rights. He did agree that
it would be best to "exercise one's self-discipline and
compassion." Many disputes can be resolved without resort
to the law and, he added jokingly, lawyers could be put out
of business by this kind of virtuous and disciplined response
to wrongdoing.
Yet the Dalai Lama also seemed concerned to reserve a
space for legal recourse in his vision of a Buddhist society
governed by the rule of law. The law of karma, he observed,
should be respected and Buddhist discipline should be
valued, but "sometimes people use karma as a way of
excuse." This, he implied, is improper. Karma should not
rationalize inaction or passivity when one's rights are
violated. The Dalai Lama appeared to disapprove of the
perspective adopted by nearly all of my interviewees, both
American and Thai. He did not agree with them that the
assertion of rights is necessarily a rejection of religious
values. He implied that they were mistaken in their belief
that pursuit of a legal remedy will invariably produce bad
karma and lead to further suffering. He appeared to
suggest that law could properly be used by virtuous people
if they were unable to obtain justice through a more
restrained and conciliatory process of negotiation.
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The Dalai Lama did not explain how a victim of
wrongdoing could be certain that he or she had reached the
point when self-abnegation should give way to legal
mobilization. Yet he clearly viewed law as an extension of
religious practice and not as a contradiction of it. His
position in this regard is entirely consistent with his effort
to emphasize the rule of law in his Buddhist polity. Yet the
devil is, quite literally, in the details. It is plausible to
understand him to mean that an undisciplined and
premature resort to law would indeed be a violation of
Buddhist teaching. Compassion and self-restraint are
fundamental values, and disputants should understand
that many conflicts are the result of delusion and
attachment. In the society he envisions, however, the
assertion of rights does have a place and does not in every
instance indicate greed, egotism, and attachment. The role
of rights and the desirability of legal recourse in a Buddhist
polity remain somewhat uncertain in his vision. When does
the attempt to protect individual interests through secular
law contradict the pursuit of selflessness and piety and
when might it actually advance religious goals? The Dalai
Lama was not willing to provide easy answers to one of the
most challenging dilemmas of our age.

